Market Access and Domestic Support Measures by Lionel Fontagné









ancun has been a disaster and the developing
countries, notwithstanding the emergence of
the G90 and G22, could be at the end of the day
badly hit by this collapse of the multilateral trade
negotiations. The Round launched in Doha
(November 2001) was after all aiming at opening
markets in order to foster growth and alleviate
poverty in the developing world.
Before Cancun, public opinion was focusing on the
interpretation of the TRIPs agreement, concerning
the enforcement of intellectual property rights for
medicines. The possibility to take measures (com-
pulsory licenses, production of generic drugs) to
protect health in case of diseases such as AIDS had
been reaffirmed in Doha, and the translation of
this position in terms of specific policies indepen-
dently from the outcome of Cancun has been a
major achievement in economic terms (Bell et al.,
2003) and from a moral point of view.But there are
a series of other key issues incorporated in this
agenda on which progress has been delayed as a
follow up of Cancun.
First, implementation-related issues have been
raised by the unbalanced deal concluded in
Marrakech. The developing world considers that
developed economies have not fulfilled their com-
mitments concerning the pace of liberalisation in
labour intensive industries (notably regarding the
implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing – ATC), whereas their own commitments
(especially concerning intellectual property) are
disproportionate. The next item is agriculture. The
famous ambiguous formulation regarding “reduc-
tions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of
export subsidies” is only part of the story. Market
access as well as distorting domestic policies are
key issues.Then come the negotiations on services,
on market access for non-agricultural products,
and on the sensitive Singapore subjects.
Interestingly, this Agenda ends by taking into con-
sideration specific needs of the Least Developed
Countries (LDCs). First, the objective of duty-free,
quota-free market access for products originating
from LDCs is endorsed by the declaration; second
the importance of provisions regarding Special and
Differential Treatment (SDT) for LDCs is reaf-
firmed.
Such an Agenda raises a lot of concerns, and the
Cancun disaster might after all be the outcome
of a lack of commitment of unconvinced stake-
holders.
First, the relationship between market access and
development, or more generally between growth
and openness, is far from clear. The literature
demonstrates that opening an economy is only a
prerequisite of growth: capital accumulation, edu-
cation, institutions are needed. Hence, liberalising
imports in the South, or conceding free access to
the markets in the North,is only a building block in
a wider development policy.
Second, it is even less clear whether the various
objectives contemplated in the DDA are mutually
compatible. If market access is favourable to
growth in the LDCs, then liberalising imports in
the North on a multilateral basis will erode the
margin of preference conceded to LDCs and will
reduce their access to these markets. If less distort-
ing farm support in the North increases world
prices of food products, LDCs that are net
importers of food will be adversely affected
through negative terms-of-trade effects. In total,
this agenda is an intricate menu of objectives and
means that could lead to deceptive or undesired
outcomes.
Against this background, this article aims at focus-
ing on objectives and possible outcomes of the
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MARKETS REMAIN PROTECTED
Improving market access is still an “unfinished busi-
ness” (WTO, 2002). Despite low average levels of
protection, agriculture and labour intensive indus-
tries carry a much higher level of protection than the
average. The dispersion of tariffs within sectors can
be very large too,due to tariff peaks on certain tariff
lines. Distortions induced by such variance in tariffs
are sizeable: a uniform duty equal to the mean tariff
would be welfare-improving and less easy to capture
by vested interests. Hence, both international trade
theory and political economy point to an extraordi-
nary loss of resources potentially associated with the
intricate system of protection exporters face,
notwithstanding administration costs of the various
regimes or compliance of rules.On top of this,a vari-
ety of instruments are used to protect markets that
make the measurement of protection levels more
complex: how to tackle this complexity will be a key
issue of the current Round.
There is no unified measure of protection
The (simple) average of bound tariffs1 for industrial
products in the Quad is 5.2 percent for Canada, 4.1
percent for the EU, 3.9 percent for the US and 3.5
percent for Japan (in 2000).In agriculture,the simple
average of bound rates is more difficult to estimate:
there are notably a series of instruments that must
be converted into ad valorem equivalents.The tenta-
tive estimation by the OECD leads to 19.5 percent
tariff for the EU, 11.7 percent for Japan, 5.5 percent
for the US and 4.6 percent for Canada. The World
Bank gets much higher results, respectively 20 per-
cent, 29.7 percent, 9.0 percent and 8.8 percent.
Developing countries are even more protective of
their markets.The (simple) average of bound tariffs
for industrial products is, for instance, 17.6 percent
for Cameroon and 31 percent for Argentina.2 The
estimated simple average of tariffs in agriculture is
88.3 percent for Colombia and 124.3 percent for
India, according to the OECD. The World Bank
finds respectively 105.6 percent and 101 percent for
the latter two countries.
MAcMaps, the new database on trade barriers
recently developed by the ITC (UNCTAD-WTO)
in collaboration with the CEPII (Bouët et al,
2001), points out a similarity of production levels
between the EU and the US, on the basis of
weighted averages (all products), namely 3.9 per-
cent for the EU and 4.3 percent for the US in 2001.
In contrast, Canada (6.7 percent) and Japan
(10.7 percent) are much more protected.
A variety of instruments of protection are
mobilised
The reason why such differences occur in the results
is a rather technical matter, which could merit con-
siderable development.To put it simply, at least four
main elements have to be taken into account. First
there is a difference between bound and applied
(MFN3) tariffs.Second a series of preferential agree-
ments have conceded preferential tariffs, below
MFN levels. Third, not all tariffs are defined in ad
valorem terms: in particular, numerous duties are
defined in dollars (per unit, per ton, etc.) and tariff
quotas are opened to exporters (lower tariff inside
the quota). Lastly, the procedure chosen to average
(and aggregate) tariffs tabulated at the detailed level
matters (Bouët et al, 2003; Martin et al, 2003). All
these elements raise challenging issues for negotia-
tors. Hence the renewal of interest for the measure-
ment of preferential access, meaning that tariff data
must be compiled at the bilateral level, for each
importer.At the same time,the calculation of ad val-
orem equivalents of specific tariffs emerges as a
strategic issue for the negotiators that will have to
chose reference unit values.4 Lastly, the calculation
of averages matters too, in as far as the formula cho-
sen to lower tariffs takes into account the average
initial level of protection.
LDCs are specialised in products severely affected
by current protection schemes
According to the WTO, there are 10.5 percent of
Canadian tariff lines with applied MFN duties





1 Bound tariffs refers to the upper limit for applied tariffs,on which
the importing country has made a commitment.
2 These figures refer to bound rates at the end of the implementa-
tion period, which is 2005 for developing countries instead of 2000.
3 Most Favoured Nation: the tariff that is conceded to any member
of the WTO.
4 The Girard proposal, for instance, devotes a full appendix to such





the majority of world
trade
above 15 percent, the threshold corresponding to
the international definition of tariff peaks for
industrial products.The ratio is 1.7 percent for the
EU, 4.3 percent for the US and 3.3 percent for
Japan respectively.
Given the concentration of such peaks in sugar,
tobacco, cereals, fruit and vegetables, and fish
products,as well as in footwear and clothing,LDCs
are potentially5 severely affected. Hoekman et al.
(2001) record more than 1,000 HS6 positions
affected by tariff peaks in the Quad, concentrated
in agriculture and in labour intensive manufactures
of interest to developing countries. But the most
potentially affected exporters are LDCs. Their
share of potentially affected exports is much larger
than the developing world average: 15 percent as
opposed to 8 percent on the US market,30 percent
to 12 percent on the Canadian one.
In addition to tariffs, quotas have been steadily
maintained under the ATC. Even if the calendar of
trade liberalisation (meaning quota dismantling,
since tariffs remain) has been respected, the actual
amount of liberalised imports has been limited,
importers having selected less sensitive products in
the early phases of liberalisation.
This lack of market access might be one explanation
of the poor performance of LDCs in world trade
over the past three decades. While the share of
developing economies as a whole in world exports
rose from one quarter to one third, the share of
LDCs declined from 1.9 percent to 0.5 percent
(IMF-WB, 2001).
Recent initiatives conceding free access to LDCs,
such as the Everything But Arms6 European initia-
tive, the African Growth and Opportunity Act imple-
mented by the United States,or the Japanese “99 per-
cent initiative”, provide a targeted solution to this
problem. For instance, an assessment of benefits for
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) of fully and unrestricted
access to the Quad countries has indicated this could
lead to a 14 percent increase in their exports, associ-
ated with a 1 percent increase in GDP (Ianchovichina
et al.2001).This is a sizeable gain in comparison to the
outcome of a complete round (see below).
Zero tariffs and zero quotas do not mean free
access however. Measures at the border, based on
environmental or technical considerations, are
imposing requirements to be matched by ex-
porters.
SPS and TBT adversely affect LDCs exports
The attempt of public policies to tackle biological
and informational risks that are specific to interna-
tional trade is lawful.The introduction of allogenic
species, predators and diseases through interna-
tional trade has been ascertained, whereas the
opportunistic behaviour by exporters (in presence
of information asymmetries and moral hazard)
raises issues related to the quality/innocuousness
of products.
The challenge is to implement “measures” at the
border without raising barriers to trade. Accord-
ingly, WTO Members must notify these measures.
On the basis of such notifications, less than one
quarter of the product categories identified at the
HS6 level of the nomenclature are traded free of
any barrier. Conversely the remaining products,
accounting for 88 percent of world merchandise
trade, do face at least one SPS or TBT justified on
environmental grounds in one market, and 13 per-
cent of world trade is effectively affected by such
measures (Fontagné et al., 2001). Food products,
such as meat, fish, and other animal products,
plants, bulbs and cut flowers, which are products of
interest to developing country exporters, are the
most concerned. And while the share of LDC
exports consisting of products potentially affected
by such measures is below the world average, the
share of directly affected exports (40 percent) is
much higher than the average. In response to this
exposure of the LDCs to such measures7,t h e
World Bank has launched its “Africa Trade
Standards Project” aiming at “Bridging the
Standards Divide”.
Internal support and export subsidies distort
world agricultural markets
A key achievement of the Uruguay Round has
been to extend multilateral discipline to domestic
5 Preferential schemes partially limit the negative impact of such
tariff peaks on LDCs exports, but tariffs remained relatively high
before the implementation of the AGOA and EBA initiatives.
6 This initiative offers zero tariff and zero quota access to all
exports emanating from LDCs, with the exception of weapons.
Calendars are phasing out protection for sugar, bananas and rice.
7 For instance, the European standard on aflatoxin has been esti-
mated by the Bank to cost African exporters over $670 million per
year in lost agricultural exports (Otsuki et al., 2000).support in the farming sector, as well as to export
subsidies. Domestic support related measures have
been classified according to the associated level of
market distortions. The so-called “boxes” charac-
terise what is prohibited, allowed, or to be phased
out. Even if the amount of domestic support grant-
ed to farmers has hardly decreased in the OECD in
the second half of the 1990s, a slight reduction in
the market distortions is observed.8 All in all, agri-
culture has been reincorporated into the arena of
multilateral negotiations, without imposing rules
that are too tight: further reductions and commit-
ments will be more sensitive (Tangermann, 2001).
The US$ 300 billion spent by the industrialised
countries on farm support are often compared to
the amount of their aid to development (which
represents only a sixth of this sum).The associated
increase in agricultural output in the North, com-
bined with reduced imports by rich countries, are
estimated to flatten world prices at the expense of
developing countries (Watkins,2003).Even though
some cases, such as the US$ 3.6 billion subsidy
granted to US cotton producers in 2001 – which led
to accusations of US dumping9 – fit well in this ana-
lytical scheme, how developing countries are actu-
ally affected remains an open question.
THE DDA SHOULD ADDRESS PREFERENTIAL
ACCESS OR RISK MISSING THE TARGET
There are numerous proposals,more or less ambi-
tious, more or less cautious, on the table. In par-
ticular, the (revised) Harbinson proposal for agri-
culture,and the Girard proposal on modalities for
negotiations on non-agricultural products are key
propositions.10 A glance at these proposals con-
vincingly shows that making progress in the nego-
tiations in the multilateral arena will necessitate
the adoption of simple schemes of trade liberali-
sation. It will also impose the need for progress in
the agricultural part of the Agenda. But if the
DDA is to reach its target, benefiting the least
advanced economies, pragmatism will be re-
quired.
The rationale for a formula approach to market
access
Concerning market access for products, there are
146 members negotiating on thousands of prod-
ucts.Under such circumstances,any means for sim-
plifying negotiations will be preferred by negotia-
tors. This is why a “formula approach”, consisting
in the systematic compression of tariffs based on a
simple arithmetic formula, could be chosen.
Of course the number of formulas that can be
implemented is only bounded by the limits of the
negotiators’ imagination. The reference is the so-
called Swiss formula in which the target tariff, t1
depends non-linearly on the initial tariff t0 and a
coefficient b:
t1 =  bt0 ,
b + t0
where b is a coefficient corresponding to the upper
limit of desired tariffs after the cut. Flexibility,
needed to make such approach acceptable by all
interested parties will lead to a slight departure
from this crude arithmetic (Francois and Martin,
2003). However, any such formula, like the one
contained in the Girard proposal11,will raise all the
issues referred to above: calculation of ad valorem
equivalents, aggregation procedures to calculate
averages, and last but not least massive preference
erosion.
Differentiated impacts on developing countries
A formula approach apparently fits well the objec-
tives of the DDA:by strongly reducing tariff peaks,
it offers better access to LDC exports in labour
intensive and agricultural goods; it largely opens
other developing countries’ markets that remain
currently highly protected and thus stimulates
South-South trade; it allows a different b coeffi-
cient for developed and developing economies to
be adopted, respecting the spirit of the SDT; lastly
it allows a different coefficient for trade in manu-
factures and food products to be used, in order to
match obvious political economy constraints.
This means, however, killing too many birds with
one stone.The two latter supposed advantages con-
tradict the objective of making agricultural mar-





8 The ratio of producer support for the OECD was 31 percent in
2000–2002 (compared to 36 percent in 1986–88).The coefficient of
nominal protection was 31 percent in 2002 (compared to 57 percent
in 1986–88). Of course there is a huge dispersion of coefficients
across OECD member countries and across commodities: rice,
sugar and milk remain the three most protected categories of prod-
ucts (OECD, 2003).
9 See IATP (2003).
10 Detailing the content of these proposals goes beyond this article.





kets more open, or of enhancing South-South
trade. But the key issue here is the erosion of pref-
erences, and here a break-down of developing
economies into sub-groups is necessary.
It has been stressed above that tariff peaks poten-
tially affect exports of LDCs which are nevertheless
conceded preferential market access (ACP coun-
tries, the GSP scheme, AGOA, EBA, etc.). Hence,
any (non-linear) formula approach will have two
effects: first to eradicate the remaining peaks faced
by LDCs exporters, and second to erode the margin
of preference they had been conceded.The net effect
can be negative.As far as their own market liberali-
sation is concerned, LDCs could be allowed to limit
their own commitments, which will have an ambigu-
ous effect on welfare too.
The remaining developing countries are in a differ-
ent situation: they are not covered by recent initia-
tives in favour of poor countries, and they do not
benefit from such preferential access, in particular
for agricultural products. These countries should
therefore strongly lobby in favour of a formula
approach eradicating tariffs. However, in some
cases this would put diversified and protected
manufacturing industries at risk, and would more
generally cut government revenue.
Formula approaches raise the risk of preference
erosion
The expected impact of any deal concluding the
round can hardly be assessed using a partial equilibri-
um framework:interactions between goods and factor
markets, between sectors, between countries, make it
necessary to rely on a general equilibrium approach.
Results drawn by multi-country computable equilibri-
um (CGE) models have been at the centre of the
debate surrounding the Uruguay round.12
As a follow up, methods have been considerably
improved and have led to a rather consensual view13
concerning the benefits of trade liberalisation for
developing countries. The larger benefits accrue
from countries’ own trade liberalisation and increase
with the square of the level of protection;static gains
to be expected are modest in relative terms (as a per-
cent of GDP), and concentrated in the agricultural
sector;dynamic gains are much more associated with
liberalisation of the manufacturing sector, in which
economies of scale are prevalent. All in all, devel-
oped countries will record the largest absolute gains
by liberalising their own agriculture, while develop-
ing countries will obtain large relative gains by open-
ing their own economies and being conceded better
market access for industrial products. Lastly, as a
group, developing countries will extract limited gain
from agricultural liberalisation in the Quad, since
net food importers will be adversely affected by the
rise in world prices of food products (Anderson et
al., 2000).
In addition to these traditional results, recent
developments have emphasised the impact of the
choice of formulas, namely linear versus Swiss for-
mulas. Fontagné et al. (2003) focus on market
access and contemplate a menu of scenarios in
which developing countries are conceded SDT.
Bilateral tariffs at the product level14,derived from
MAcMaps, are cut according to a linear formula
(where tariff peaks15 can be included or excluded
from the liberalisation), versus a truncated Swiss
formula16 (applied to all tariffs). Coefficients of
reduction are those suggested by previous
rounds17, and the SDT offered to developing coun-
tries is a lower coefficient of linear reduction and a
larger b coefficient in the Swiss formula. Results
reported in the Table highlight that benefits of
increased market access at the world level are
much higher with a Swiss formula and, in contrast,
rather limited if one adopts a linear formula
excluding peaks. Considering the Swiss formula
combined with the SDT,the largest benefits accrue
to Japan, where agriculture is highly protected.
This is also why EU gains are much larger than US
ones.18 Lastly, ACP countries record very limited
gains, in particular in comparison to developing
Asia which has in the past been conceded less pref-
erences by industrialised importers.
A formula approach will, however, lead to a size-
able erosion of preferences conceded to the poor-
12 Goldin et al. (1993) and Francois et al (1993) are the key refer-
ences for ex ante World Bank, OECD and GATT estimates. See
Francois (2000) for a survey of the ex post literature.
13 This view is however challenged by Whalley (2000), who points
out inconsistencies in the results obtained by the various models.
14 HS6 level.
15 Tariff peaks are defined in this exercise as those superior to
15 percent in manufacturing, energy and raw materials, and those
above 85 percent in agriculture and agrofood.
16 In a truncated Swiss formula, the reduction is linear up to the
threshold defined as a tariff peak, and non-linear thereafter.
17 35 percent for the linear formula and a Swiss formula,and a coef-
ficient b equal to 28 (manufactures) or 58 (food).
18The same explanation pertains to the occurrence of more limited
benefits to developing countries, when such special treatment is
offered.est developing countries so far, with the aim of
favouring exports of small and insufficiently diver-
sified economies.The more specialised the export-
ers, the larger the benefits extracted in the past
from preferential access schemes and the stronger
the adverse effects of market opening they will
have to cope with.
Even tariff peaks favour LDC exporters to some
extent: in 1999, ACP countries benefited from a
preference for peak tariff products on the
European market, reaching 28 percentage points,
as compared with only 6 points for all products
(Hoekman et al., 2002).
This is why a formula approach will put the bene-
fits of past policies at risk. A limited number of
products is affected by such issues (less than
15 percent of HS6 categories), and an even more
limited number of importers having conceded size-
able preferences: among OECD countries, the
EU15 is the most prominent concerned importer
(Fontagné & Mimouni, 2002).
While free access for peak products limited to LDCs
would lead to an 11 percent increase in their total
exports, the extension of such free access to other
developing countries would halve such benefit;and a
further reduction of the MFN duty to 5 percent
would result in such benefits to disappear for LDCs
(Hoekman et al, 2002). SSA exports, initially boost-
ed by free access conceded by Quad countries’ ini-
tiatives (AGOA, etc.), would be slightly reduced if
liberalisation by other developing markets compen-
sated for the erosion of preferences on industrialised
markets. But welfare gains would then be reduced,
due to a deterioration in the terms-of-trade associat-
ed with a shift from high-priced industrialised mar-
kets to low-priced developing ones (Ianchovichina et
al., 2001).
Puzzling impacts of a 
liberalisation in agriculture
A CGE framework can also be
used to examine the decomposi-
tion of benefits among the vari-
ous items of the DDA agenda.
On the basis of a scenario for a
linear reduction in tariffs of
50 percent for industrial and
food products, in border mea-
sures for services,in export subsi-
dies, and in domestic support19,
Francois et al (2003) find that lib-
eralisation at the border in agriculture (27 percent of
world gains) leads to larger gains than market access
for non-agricultural products (respectively 16 per-
cent). This is even less the case for services (11 per-
cent). But the striking result is that the reduction in
domestic support only secures 4 percent of the total
gains20, naturally accruing to countries reducing this
distortion, namely the industrialised ones. Hence,
contrary to a simplistic analysis of the associated dis-
tortions, there is not so much to be gained in this
area, and the expected benefits to developing coun-
tries should be considered cautiously.
This confirms previous partial equilibrium estimates,
which indicate that developing countries as a group
would suffer a welfare loss in case of a 50 percent
reduction in domestic support for agriculture in the
developed countries (Hoekman et al, 2002).
In total, tariff reduction matters much more, for the
developing world, than do the domestic policies in
OECD countries. How can such puzzling effects be
understood? In addition to issues referred to above
(preferential access, tariff peaks in agriculture,
domestic support), initial trade patterns and the
associated terms-of-trade effects matter, in the face
of any substantial increase in world agricultural
prices consecutive to reduced distortions in world
agricultural markets (FAPRI, 2002).
The (revised) Harbinson proposal, combining a pro-
gressive reduction of tariffs21, if not a Swiss formula,
with a SDT (lower reduction in tariffs) and a reduc-
tion in domestic support and export subsidies, offers
a stylised framework to address such issues (Bouët
CESifo Forum 3/2003 8
Focus
Cutting agricultural
support in the 
developed countries
leads to a welfare
loss of the develop-
ing countries
Long-run percentage welfare change
% Welfare Linear  Linear formula Swiss Swiss formula
formula excluding  formula + Special & 
peaks Differential 
Treatment
EU-25 0.38 0.14 0.55 0.47
USA 0.18 0.09 0.24 0.12
Japan 0.86 0.29 1.45 1.29
Cairns 0.30 0.14 0.35 0.39
Developing Asia 0.80 0.28 1.07 0.91
ACP countries 0.43 0.26 0.41 0.29
Other countries 0.55 0.20 0.79 0.70
World 0.42 0.16 0.61 0.51
Source: Fontagné et al. (2002).
19The scenario also includes a reduction in trade costs,correspond-
ing to a trade facilitation.
20 The remaining elements are trade facilitation (34 percent) and
the interaction term (8 percent).
21 Tariffs above 90 percent would be reduced by 60 percent.CESifo Forum 3/2003 9
Focus
et al, 2003). Reductions in domestic support alone
would induce a limited welfare gain at the world
level, resulting in a welfare gain for the EU and
Japan,and a loss elsewhere,in particular for the ACP
countries. In contrast, a reduction in border protec-
tion alone would lead to larger gains at the world
level, shared among all country groups, with the
exception of the former Soviet Union. Lastly, the
combination of all elements of the Harbinson pro-
posal would mainly benefit the Cairns group,the EU
and its periphery, Japan and South Korea, but would
harm ACP countries, China, the former Soviet
Union, and the rest of the world.
CONCLUSION
Considering the wide agenda drawn up in Doha,
market access (compared to domestic support)
remains a key item of the negotiations in order to
reach the development target of the DDA (Hertel
et al., 2002). Given the complexity of the negotia-
tions and the number of parties involved, a formu-
la approach is to be preferred.Any non-linear for-
mula strongly eroding tariff peaks will boost wel-
fare gains at the world level. However, the road to
hell being paved with good intentions, this will be
at the expense of preferences conceded to LDCs.
This is why the erosion of preferences resulting
from the round should be carefully assessed in
order to avoid putting the benefits of past policies
and recent initiatives such as EBA and AGOA at
risk. Acting in favour of development is not such
an easy task given the highly differentiated situa-
tion of developing countries.
There are limits to the arguments raised in this
article. Preferential access is generally associated
with the enforcement of rules of origin for export-
ed products, hampering LDCs to take full advan-
tage of the preferences they have been conceded
(Brenton,2002).Second,trade preferences without
MFN access for the products of interest to other
developing countries will not benefit the majority
of the world’s poor, since most of the world’s poor
live outside LDCs (Hoekman, 2003). Third, multi-
lateral trade liberalisation, through its combined
impacts on prices and incomes, does not systemati-
cally alleviate poverty in non-LDC developing
countries (Hertel, Preckel et al., 2002).
Last but not least, raising fears about preference
erosion does not provide an alternative to the
Agenda: reasoning in terms of country vulnerabili-
ty is certainly more appropriate than favouring a
second-best situation.Vulnerable countries should,
for instance,be conceded no or very simple rules of
origin, should receive assistance necessary to
match SPS and TBTs.The scheduled phasing out of
their preferential access should be compensated by
commitments in terms of development aid, in
order to build institutions or infrastructures mak-
ing it possible to reap the benefits of a less distort-
ed world market. Lastly, they should be secured
free access not only to developed countries, but
also to other developing economies.
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